Finality, Sir, is not the Language of Politics by Mitchell, James
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finality, Sir, is not the Language of Politics
Citation for published version:
Mitchell, J, Finality, Sir, is not the Language of Politics, 2015, Web publication/site, European Futures,
Edinburgh.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publisher Rights Statement:
© 2015 James Mitchell. Published under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) License
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
European Futures | Article No 9                                                                            Page 1 of 3 
Article No 9  
 
 
Finality, Sir, is not the Language of Politics 
 
Author(s): James Mitchell 
 
Permalink: http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-1277 
 
Publication: 10 July 2015 
 
Article text: 
 
Referendums do not necessarily solve the issues they are meant to address, writes 
James Mitchell. He argues that, similar to the Scotland independence referendum, 
the EU referendum is unlikely to be definitive, but it will shape the UK’s relationship 
with the EU whatever the outcome. 
 
If David Cameron imagines that the UK’s referendum on EU membership will bring 
closure to an issue that has divided his party and country, then he might reflect on 
the recent experience following the Scottish independence referendum. 
 
In October 2012, the UK and Scottish Governments signed the Edinburgh Agreement 
stating that the referendum should: 
• have a clear legal base; 
• be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; 
• be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, 
government and people; and 
• deliver a fair test and decisive expression of the views of people in 
Scotland and a result that everyone will respect. 
 
The Scottish referendum almost achieved these objectives, but nobody could 
pretend that the Scottish Question has been resolved. The majority against 
independence was accepted by the Scottish Government but debate continues, 
further extensions of powers are planned and there is a real prospect of a second 
independence referendum at some point in the not-too-distant future. 
 
The Scottish Question is as much a live issue today as it was at any time in the 
previous century. The Scottish National Party (SNP), as the main advocate of 
independence, has never been stronger. The referendum removed the immediate 
prospect of Scottish independence but has hardly brought closure or much comfort 
to the UK Government. 
 
The reasons that the EU referendum is unlikely to bring closure are broadly the 
same as the Scottish referendum. The UK’s European Question is not really one 
question but several interconnected questions and issues. The European ‘primordial 
soup’ continues to change. New issues arise and old questions re-emerge with 
regularity. The referendum will offer a simple question to answer a complex set of 
issues. 
 
Both Scottish and EU referendums were about relationships and relationships 
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require constant attention. It would be rare for some event or decision to define a 
relationship in perpetuity. Changed circumstances can lead to changed expectations. 
Even an emphatic vote for or against membership cannot ignore the fact that the 
UK will need to engage in the European primordial soup. Leaving the EU only means 
that the UK’s engagement with the EU will occur from the outside. It can no more 
cut itself off from the rest of Europe than an independent Scotland could cut itself 
off from the rest of the UK. 
 
If the UK votes to remain in the EU, then there is no reason to believe that this will 
mark a shift to a more positive engagement. There is no equivalent of the 
Edinburgh Agreement. Any hint of civil service involvement on the side of continued 
membership will be raised as evidence that the referendum was unfair. Far less 
effort has been made to ensure that losers will consent to the outcome than 
occurred with the Scottish referendum. 
 
The Scottish referendum now looks to have been an important catalyst altering 
Scotland’s party system. Labour found itself on the winning side in the referendum 
but at considerable cost as a parliamentary party. The referendum provided the 
bridge over which a significant body of Labour voters shifted to the SNP. It is quite 
possible that those who vote against EU membership will have been shaken loose 
from an already weak association with the Conservatives or Labour. Even if UKIP 
loses the referendum, it may be able to mobilise a high proportion of opponents of 
the EU to support it at subsequent elections, especially if there is a widespread 
perception amongst Eurosceptics that the referendum was unfair. 
 
Referendums have been used by party leaders to manage difficult internal party 
politics. Such use may offer a temporary means of managing a problem. The EU 
referendum may well suit David Cameron, especially if he intends to stand down as 
Prime Minister in a few years’ time. If the Scottish independence referendum is an 
event he would prefer to forget, then he might recall the words of one of his Tory 
predecessors. 
 
In 1859, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Benjamin Disraeli argued the case for 
extending the franchise. He expressed the intention to propose a measure that 
would ‘as far as the circumstances of the age in which we live can influence our 
opinion, will be a conclusive settlement’ but admitted that, ‘Finality, Sir, is not the 
language of politics’. Disraeli most certainly did not bring finality to franchise 
extensions. Indeed, the franchise for the Scottish independence referendum, 
permitted by the Edinburgh Agreement, saw another extension with votes for 16 
and 17 year olds. 
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sets debates on Scotland’s constitutional status into wider historical and public 
policy contexts. 
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